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Abstract 
One of the critical unanswered questions relating to the shadow-banking system has been to 
quantify its scale in an industry where entities, by design, are opaque and often outside of 
regulated and publically shared frameworks.   
However almost all shadow banking entities, including hedge funds, private equity funds and 
special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”), interact with the financial markets via regulated 
investment banks. For example, many SPVs are in fact originated as part of investment 
banking business and hedge funds typically transact in financial markets exclusively via the 
“prime brokerage” division of investment banks.  
This interface with the regulated banking environment combines with the typical practise by 
investment banks of equalizing compensation (Including bonus) ratios to revenues globally 
which then allows identification of the implied difference in revenues and hence assets that 
represents the shadow banking system.  
The paper will present for critique the results of this methodology to estimate the UK shadow 
banking system including European business managed from the UK. The estimate will imply 
a larger scale of shadow banking than previous estimates at £548 billion which, when 
combined with hedge fund assets of £360 billion (FSA, 2011) gives total shadow banking 
assets of over £900 billion. It is proposed that the large gap between the estimates of this 
paper and other estimates reflects the huge, and previously unknown, scale of offshore 
activities of UK investment banks.  
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Introduction 
From 2000 onwards the shadow banking industry grew in size and importance globally. In 
particular there was huge growth in the number and size of hedge funds, private equity funds 
and special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”). This was particalty true for the UK which became a 
global centre for hedge fund and private equity fund activities. In addition the UK became the 
global centre at many investment banks for managing the risk and operations of SPVs, 
related to structured financial transactions (Toporowski et al, 2013). In the paper the UK has 
been selected as the case study due to its importance to off-balance sheet activity globally. 
Such vehicles became important client segments for investments banks who acted both as 
principles for investments assets in such vehicles and as prime brokers for them. The key 
drivers for this growth were the fact that such vehicles were unregulated and, for investment 
banks, off balance sheet, thus ensuring their activities were opaque. The risks of these 
activities became apparent during the financial crisis when the lack of transparency and the 
unknown scale of activities and assets created panic amongst financial markets participants 
who were unable to assess counterparty or market risks (Independent Commission on 
banking, 2011). Given such events there have been calls for greater regulations and 
transparency of the activities of shadow banking, but in reality minimal regulation has been 
enacted.  
Further the scale of the activities remains opaque and this reduces the influence of calls for 
regulation. Current estimates rely on trade bodies or regulators but both are highly likely to 
be substantially incomplete and understate the scale of shadow banking. For example, by 
definition, regulators lack access to accurate data on unregulated activities and trade bodies 
disclosures are typically voluntary and unaudited.  In addition, and critical to this paper, all 
exclude any estimate of the level of assets in SPVs originated by, but off balance sheets of, 
investment banks.  
This paper seeks to estimate the scale of this underestimation using a new methodology and 
using the UK as an example. The method uses the fact that bonus figures are globally 
consistent ratios of revenues and are publically disclosed in UK subsidiary financial 
statements on a basis that reflects true economic activity in the location. This contrasts with 
disclosed revenues and assets in such financial statements which are substantially distorted 
by accounting, tax and regulatory arbitrage. The bonus figure can then used to imply 
revenues and then assets using bonus: revenue and revenue: asset ratios from group 
financial statements. Comparison of the reported on-balance sheet assets and the implied 
assets estimates the off-balance sheet assets of investment banks.  
 
Detail of the Method 
Investment banks disclose financial information through both consolidated group financial 
statements and in subsidiary financial statements, as required by regulatory or legal 
requirements. Such financial statements follow standard accounting principles and are 
typically audited. However in such statements there can be significant differences between 
the accounting statements and economic reality of investment banks activities. For example, 
and by design, they exclude off balance sheet assets, including those held or transferred to 
SPVs, assets transferred to regulatory arbitrage purposes and revenue transfers designed to 
reduce taxation.  
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These problems of financial statements failing to reflect economic reality is particular acute 
for subsidiaries as there is no correction, through group consolidation accounting, of inter-
subsidiary transfers. In addition, for high tax jurisdictions, such as the UK, revenue transfers 
offshore are particularly prevalent1. This means that a subsidiary’s financial statements are 
likely to be misleading, especially for revenues and assets, in representing true economic 
activities. 
However, compensation figures for subsidiaries are not typically managed in this way as 
they are required to be accounted for in the subsidiary of the employees tax residency. 
Compensation is composed of both salary and bonuses. Bonuses are usually calculated 
based on percentages of revenues which are consistent across years and locations and use 
economically correct revenues which are known from internal management accounts. This 
reflects the common practise within investment banks of paying bonuses based on 
individuals performance, as measured by such internal management accounts, and the 
practise of equalising bonus allocations for all global locations. This means that 
compensation, unlike asset and revenues, as disclosed in publically disclosed subsidiary 
accounts is more fairly matched to the jurisdiction and reflects its true economic activity. 
This method identified the bonus from UK subsidiary accounts. Subsidiaries were identified 
from the FSA register and from Company House registrations. Accounts are filed under 
limited company legislation at the UK Company House and are publically available. In some 
instances employment is managed through a number of subsidiaries including specialist 
“service” subsidiaries which are designed to manage employees and limit liability of 
investment banks in relation to employment rights. All such subsidiaries have been identified 
where possible.  Then asset, revenues and bonuses from global accounts are used to 
calculate ratios and these are applied to the bonus figure for the UK alone to imply total UK 
assets. The implied assets is then compared to the disclosed on-balance sheet assets to 
give the off-balance sheet assets.  
These figures are then summed across all the selected sample of banks to give an estimate 
of the UK banking off-balance sheet assets held in SPVs. For a given year this method gives 
the “flow” for the year represented by new trades due to the accounting for profits on a mark-
to-market or mark-to-model basis. Using an estimated 5 year average deal maturity, stock of 
off balance sheet assets can then be calculated. 
 
An Example: Goldman Sachs 
Goldman Sachs is an important participant in UK financial markets and a global leader in 
structured products. The UK is also important to Goldman Sachs with a significant portion of 
global revenues being generated by the UK office and the European business managed 
from their London office. Goldman Sachs also follow the common business practise of 
equalising bonus ratios regionally, as assumed in the methodology. The annual report 
comments that, “The cost drivers of the firm taken as a whole —compensation, headcount 
                                                           
1
 The scale of the activity, in relation to tax, was revealed when new disclosure requirements were 
introduced by the Inland Revenue requiring disclosure of legal tax avoidance schemes of this type 
and, between 2004 and 2011, more than 2,000 different schemes and instruments were disclosed. In 
a particularly flagrant example, Barclays manipulated the buy-back of its own bonds and tax credits 
on interest to avoid over £500 million in UK corporate tax until this scheme was retrospectively 
stopped by the UK Inland revenue in 2012 (Toporowski et al, 2013).  
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and levels of business activity —are broadly similar in each of the firm’s business 
segments.”2.   
To illustrate the methodology, the figure 1 sets out the calculation for Goldman Sachs.  
 
Figure 1: Example calculation for Goldman Sachs, 2010 & 2011. 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs and Goldman Sachs International Bank Financial Statements for 
2010 and 2011, http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/ 
 
As illustrated, global compensation: revenue ratios for 2010 and 2011 average 40.8% 
globally but for the UK average 54.4%. Global revenue: asset ratio is 3.7%. When applying 
these global ratios to the UK compensation this implies additional economic revenues of 
£0.8 billion and additional assets of £22 billion annually. Assuming an average maturity for a 
structured product of 5 years, off-balance sheet assets are calculated as £114 billion or 13% 
of on-balance sheet assets.  
 
Results for the UK 
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 Extract from Goldman Sachs 2011 Annual report, page 180 
GOLDMAN SACHS 2010 2011 Average
Global Consolidated Group Financial Statements
USD millions
Gross Assets 911,332        923,225        917,279       
Total Revenues 39,161           28,811           33,986          
Compensation & benefits 15,376           12,223           13,800          
Compensation: Revenue ratio 39.3% 42.4% 40.8%
Revenues: Assets ratio 4.3% 3.1% 3.7%
Goldman Sachs International Bank (UK FSA Regulated Subsidiary)
STG millions
Revenues 7,373             5,131             6,252            
Gross Assets 750,727        942,126        846,427       
Compensation & benefits 3,969             2,821             3,395            
Compensation: Revenue ratio 53.8% 55.0% 54.4%
Estimate of undocumentated assets
STG millions
Compensation difference % 14.6% 12.6% 13.6%
Implied UK revenues 1,074             644                 859                
Implied UK off balance sheet assets (Flow) 24,996           20,642           22,819          
Implied UK off balance sheet assets (Stock) 114,095       
% of UK On-balance sheet assets 13%
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This methodology was then repeated for the sample selected. The sample was the banks 
with a top 10 UK or EMEA market shares in structured financing3. They are Barclays, 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and JP Morgan4.  
Subsidiaries are detailed in the appendix for each bank. In some instances the UK 
subsidiaries used also operate all European businesses. Results are shown in figure 2 
below.  
 
Figure 2: Estimated Off-balance Sheet Assets of Selected UK Based Investment Banking Subsidiaries.  
 
Source: Annual financial statements of global groups and UK/EMEA subsidiaries, 2010 & 
2011. (See appendix for details). 
 
As can be seen the result give an annual asset flow for 2010 and 2011 using the 
methodology outlines. Applying an estimated five-year average maturity, level of off-balance 
sheet assets in the UK financial system in £546 billion, or 26% of on-balance sheet assets.  
Also notable is the range of estimates between individual investment banks from 10% to 
51% and from a maximum of £169 billion to a minimum of £4.6 billion. Such differences may 
reflect differences in business activities. For example, Barclays are highly active in tax 
arbitrage and structured products whereas Citibank are more concentrated in vanilla, non-
structured transactions. However it may also be due to issues in the data and this is 
discussed further below.  
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 As disclosed in industry league tables 
4
 UBS also has a large market share but does not make required disclosures. 
STG millions 2010 2011
Average 
(Flow)
Average 
(Stock)
% of On BS 
UK Assets
Barclays 19,154     48,835     33,994     169,972  15%
Morgan Stanley 12,898     8,855       10,876     54,382     38%
Goldman Sachs 24,996     20,642     22,819     114,095  13%
Citibank 1,770       96             933           4,666       26%
Deutsche Bank 20,915     4,350       12,633     63,165     10%
Credit Suisse 14,971     20,378     17,674     88,372     51%
JP Morgan       15,719         5,114       10,417 52,083     27%
110,424  108,270  109,347  546,735  26%
Off Balance Sheet UK/EMEA Assets
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Critique of the Methodology 
There are a number of important considerations to be made in assessing the accuracy of 
this method.  
Firstly, there are important assumptions, including a stable, globally consistent bonus to 
revenue and revenue to asset ratio, and the firmness of these assumptions vary. The bonus: 
revenue ratios is reasonably established as this is standard practise in investment banking, 
as indicated by both explicit disclosures (Such as Goldman Sachs), stable actual ratios and 
known internal practises. However revenue: asset ratios can vary considerable over time.  
Secondly, such the data used in this paper requires further refinement. For example, UK and 
EMEA financial statements are not fully isolated in some instances and it would require 
further clarification to ensure inclusion of all major subsidiaries. In addition financial data 
require normalisation across years. For example, 2011 data has been impacted by large 
provisions relating to Euro zone credit exposures or 2010 by UK bank levy’s and ideally 
these would be excluded to give normalised revenue and compensation trends. Such lack of 
normalization, in particular, impacts the granular results for different investment banks and 
years materially.  
Nevertheless, as an estimate of the industry level of off-balance sheet assets, it is 
considered that the method produces a broadly correct result, although it would benefit from 
further development.  
 
Conclusion 
The results estimate UK-based off-balance sheet assets of £546 billion or 26% of on-
balance sheet assets. The method requires further development and refinement but 
nevertheless represents an reasonable estimate of a previously unknown and yet very 
important figure.  
When combined with FSA estimates of UK hedge fund assets of £360 billion, this given an 
estimated assets of the UK shadow banking system of over £900 billion. Such a huge asset 
base of unregulated and opaque assets underpins calls for greater regulation and  
disclosure.  
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Appendix 
Sample of UK investment banks used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Head office
Sample (See note)
UK Legal Entities (Selected from FSA Register 
& Annual reports)
1 Barclays Barclays Bank plc 
2 HSBC HSBC Bank plc
n/a Royal Bank of Scotland Group Mergered with Natwest (Not material in SB)
n/a Lloyds Not material in SB
Morgan Stanley Bank International Ltd
Morgan Stanley Securities Ltd
Goldman Sachs International
Goldman Sachs International Bank
5 Citibank Citibank International Plc
DBOI Global Services
DB Group Services
Credit Suisse AG
Credit Suisse UK Ltd
8 UBS UBS AG
9 JP Morgan  J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd
6 Deutsche Bank
7 Credit Suisse
UK
Non -UK
3 Morgan Stanley
4 Goldman Sachs
